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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Postal letters are a means of communication between two parties with at 
least one of them having a positive willingness to pay. Postal operators offer 
a  service  that  exploits  this  willingness  to  pay.  Interestingly,  virtually  all 
postal operators apply a pre-paid mechanism that goes back on Rowland 
Hill‟s proposal of charging only the sender-side of the market instead of the 
receivers  too.  This  involves  the  potential  for  senders  to  bill  the  postage 
onward to the receivers, which varies between the various classes of mail 
and is essentially determined by the bargaining position between the two 
communicating parties. Postage for advertising mail remains on the sender-
side,  while  postage  in  commercial  relationships  is  usually  –  directly  or 
indirectly – passed on to the receivers. E.g., Swiss banks increasingly bill 
postage for bank statements directly to their clients (i.e. the receivers).
1  
The fact that mail consists of two parties communicating with each other 
over  a choice of platforms (postal operators)  makes the postal market 
potentially two-sided. If this two-sided market is served by only one operator 
(the current situation in most countries), the designated postal operator has 
the necessary bargaining power to cho ose the pricing mechanism of  its 
choice (sender pays, receiver pays, or a mix between the two). In a second 
step, senders and receivers are able to reallocate postage by  various means, 
such as billing surcharges as in the case of bank statements  mentioned 
above. In competitive markets, two effects could potentially lead to different 
optimal pricing principles: (a) the historical operator loses its market power 
on the sender side because of competing networks, and ( b) receivers get 
bargaining power in terms of whom to give the right to operate their P.O. 
box.  The  latter  effect  could  in  principle  yield  a situation  where  large 
receivers prefer P.O. boxes over mail boxes as the former gives them the 
possibility to exact better service or pricing arrangements, based on  their 
size, and to allow access to their address exclusively to a specific operator. 
In our contribution, we analyze whether the traditional pricing concept 
(sender pays principle) remains dominant in competitive postal markets. We 
divide the competitive postal market in to a processing and delivery part, 
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where a postal operator faces two kinds of customers: senders in the former 
and receivers in the latter part of the market. Based on the contributions by 
Laffont,  Rey  and  Tirole  (1998),  Rochet  and  Tirole  (2003),  Armstrong 
(2006), and Panzar (2006) we develop a theoretical model with consumers' 
platform choice between two operators competing in linear upstream and 
two-part downstream prices and being interconnected by a symmetric access 
regime to P.O. boxes. Thereby, we extend the analysis of a delivery flat rate 
by  Felisberto  et  al.  (2006)  and  Friedli  et  al.  (2006)  to  a  competitive 
environment and assess optimum pricing schemes in market equilibrium. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the background 
on  the  theory  of  two-sided  markets  and its  relevance  for  postal  markets. 
Section 3 presents the model outline. Section 4 provides a rough calibration 
of the model and presents the derived optimal pricing structure for the two-
sided P.O. box market. We conclude in Section 5. 
 
 
2.  BACKGROUND ON TWO-SIDED MARKETS  
In two-sided markets, platforms enable the interaction of two or more 
groups of agents, where the surplus of one group of agents depends on the 
number of users connected to the platform on the other side (Armstrong 
2006).  Real  world  examples  of  such  two-sided  markets  with  multiple 
platforms include many internet applications, the credit card industry, radio 
or  television  broadcasting,  peer-to-peer  networks,  computer  operating 
systems, or telecommunication networks. A precise definition of a two-sided 
market  is given by Rochet and Tirole (2005) and depends mainly on its 
pricing properties:  
 
„Consider a platform charging per-interaction charges αB and αS to the buyer and the 
seller sides. The Market for interactions between the two sides is one-sided if the volume 
V of transactions realized on the platform depends only on the aggregate price level α = 
αB + αS, i.e. is insensitive to reallocations of this price between the buyer and the seller. 
If by contrast V varies with αB while α is kept constant, the market is said to be two-
sided.‟ 
 
Hence,  postal  services  would  not  satisfy  the  definition  of  two-sided 
markets, if mail demand remained the same in case postage was charged to 
receivers instead of senders. 
Two-sided markets are linked closely to network externalities.
2 Rochet 
and Tirole (2003) note, „many if not most markets with network externalities 
are two-sided‟. Armstrong (2006) even includes (cross) network externalities 
in  his  definition  of  two-sided  markets:  the number of  subscribers  of  one 
group increases the surplus of the other one. Consequently, for virtually any 
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is the core of the business with pricing being one of the most crucial success 
factors to overcome the chicken-and-egg problem involved when setting up 
a new platform. From this point of view, two-sided markets can be seen as 
the  subset  of  markets  with  network  externalities,  where the allocation  of 
prices among the various groups of agents affects the degree of exploitation 
of those externalities. This, in turn, is the case if the platforms pricing policy 
cannot  be  offset  by  private  redistribution  between  the  various  groups  of 
agents.  In  postal  markets,  for  example,  where  postage  predominantly  is 
prepaid by the senders, often receivers finally pay the postage, as senders bill 
it onwards (e.g. distance selling). Hence, it is not a priori clear, if the postal 
market is two-sided. 
 
Pricing structures in two-sided markets 
In two-sided markets, we often observe pricing structures in which one 
side  (one  group  of  agents)  heavily  cross-subsidizes  the  other  side  of  the 
market. Internet search engines provide their core business (searching the 
internet)  free, radio  and TV channels  are  free  of  charge,  and  credit  card 
holders even get fringe benefits for the frequent use of their card. Table 1 
provides an overview of pricing structures in selected two-sided industries. 
At a first glance, the cross-subsidization is astonishing as both sides in 
each of those markets derive a positive utility of the platform and thus in 
principle  would  have  a  positive  willingness  to  pay.  Yet,  those  pricing 
policies  persist  even  in  mature  markets,  and  it  appears  dominant  in 
competitive two-sided markets not to exploit the willingness to pay on one 
side of the market. 
 
Table 1: Overview of pricing structures in two-sided markets 
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In general, cross-subsidization aims at establishing a consumer base that 
as a whole can be made available to a group of individual commercial agents 
aiming to sell products to this consumer base. Thus, most two-sided markets 
are in effect intermediaries  that derive  their  economic  value  by  reducing 
transaction costs or information asymmetries (mostly between sellers and 
potential buyers). To get the critical mass and resolving the typical chicken-
and-egg problem, the dominant strategy appears to heavily cross-subsidize 
one group of agents either directly  (low, zero or even negative price)  or 
indirectly through tying a valuable product (free internet query, free radio 
broadcasting)  with  a  product  establishing  negative  network  externalities 
(advertisement).  
Very close to the latter interpretation and related to the formal resolution 
of  two-sided  market  models,  two-sided  markets  can  be  seen  as  ordinary 
markets with the product being the provision of a client base which exhibits 
acquiring expenses equaling the loss on a second product offered to that 
client base. Thereby, acquiring takes place indirectly by offering a valuable, 
subsidized service (free internet query). In most of the cases, this valuable 
product inhibits substantial economies of scale (and only indirect network 
externalities  over  the  other  side  of  the  market)  which  in  turn  reduce 
acquiring  cost  per  client,  whereas  the  marginal  indirect  revenue  remains 
constant. Consequently, two-sided markets are heavily concentrated.  
 
Two-sidedness of the postal market 
We now turn to the important question whether postal markets are two-sided 
markets according to the definition of Rochet and Tirole (2005) cited above.  
Today, in most postal markets it is secured that any address is connected to 
the  postal  network  by  means  of  the  “Universal  Service  Obligation”  that 
obliges  as  least  one  postal  network  to  provide  “universal  access”  for 
universal services such as letters and parcels and to deliver that service to 
any  address  throughout  the  country.  Thus,  by  regulation,  network 
externalities are secured. Additionally, universal providers are – for example 
in Switzerland – by law not allowed to charge the receiver‟s for connecting 
them to net network. Even New Zealand, where the postal market is since a 
decade  fully  liberalized  and  Universal  Service  was  reduced to  its  basics, 
forbids  in  its  “deed  of  understanding”  with  New  Zealand  Post  a  “rural 
delivery fee” aimed at residents  in remote areas. Those universal service 
definitions  indicate  that  senders  exhibit  a  positive  network  externality  if 
everybody is connected to the postal network.  
However, it is not yet clear whether total demand is affected by a change 
in the pricing structure, for example if postage was to be paid by receivers Pricing in competitive two-sided mail markets  page 5 
 
 
too as it was the case before the reform of Rowland Hill. History on the 
reform  of  Rowland  Hill  reveals  that  demand  virtually  exploded after the 
change in the price structure towards „sender pays it all‟. Thus, we have a 
first indication of the two-sidedness of the postal market.  
Research by Felisberto et al. (2006) on the receiver pays principle in the 
postal sector analyzes the effects of the introduction of a delivery flat rate, 
where receivers are given the choice between free P.O. box delivery and 
costly last mile doorstep delivery (in the form of a yearly flat rate).
3 This 
would  enable  a  monopolistic  platform  to  reduce  senders ‟  tariffs.  By 
exclusion  of a  rebalancing  between  the  two  groups of  agents behind  the 
scenes and by assumption that P.O. box switchers originate the same amount 
of mail as before, positive demand effects were found. 
More recent research by Friedli et al. (2006) on the delivery flat rate 
indicates that up to 35% of the customers switching to P.O. box delivery 
would not anymore empty their mailbox. This would cause a significant drop 
in mail volumes. This survey points towards the presence of two-sidedness 
in the postal market.  
A similar argument is the following. If the receiver was about to pay, the 
sender  has  no  guarantee  that  the  receiver  accepts  the  mail  (for  example, 
paying postage for accepting unwanted direct mailings).  Receivers would 
most probably reject unwanted mail, which in turn postal operators would 
send back to the senders by charging them accordingly. This would reduce 
response rates clearly and reduce the amount of direct mail sent as observed 
in Chile.  
A contrary argument might be that most senders of transactional mail 
bill  their  postage  onwards  to  the  receivers.  Thereby,  single  piece  tariffs 
instead of (lower)  business customer tariffs are charged. Thus, receivers‟ 
perceived  cost  might  reduce  if  postal  operators  would  bill  the  postage 
directly to them (positive demand effect). 
We conclude that there exists large evidence that postal markets indeed 
are  two-sided.  This  was  first  recognized  by  Panzar  (2006).  Our  main 
contribution to the literature is the formalization of a competitive two-sided 




3.  THE TWO-SIDED POSTAL MARKET MODEL 
Our two-sided postal market model consists of two groups of agents, 
namely senders and receivers of mail, and two platforms (postal operators) 
linking the senders and the receivers. Senders choose over whom to hand 
over  their  mail,  whereas  receivers  have  the  possibility  to  grant  special 
delivery rights to one of the two operators.
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involves the necessity of interconnection of the two operators; In order to 
offer end-to-end service to her sender, a postal operator needs access to the 
other‟s delivery network. Otherwise, an operator would not be able to reach 
P.O. box addresses operated by the other one. We are primarily interested, 
how different interconnection rates affect the platforms pricing strategies, 
thus we treat access prices as exogenous and provide sensitivity analysis in 
Section 4. For simplicity reasons, we assume reciprocal access pricing. 
Thus,  there  are  two  sides  in  the  postal  market:  Upstream,  postal 
operators  compete  for  sending  customers;  downstream,  they  compete  for 
receiving  customers.  We  follow  Laffont,  Rey  and  Tirole  (1998)  in  the 
modeling of network competition and link the postal upstream market on the 
sender‟s side to a downstream market for local delivery monopolies.  
In our model, total mail demand is a function of the sum of the sender‟s 
price pu and the receiver‟s price pd per item. Total volume is determined by 
the sender primarily, but we assume that through private redistribution (as 
observed  in  practice)  the  receiver  influences  the  sender‟s  communication 
channel and vice versa. We include the possibility that the operators‟ optimal 
behavior leads to an interdependence of these prices and a delivery flat rate, 
such that total volume is sensitive to reallocations of the total price. Hence, 
the  model  qualifies  as a  two-sided  market  (with  multihoming).  Figure  1 
provides a graphical representation of the model outline. 
 
Figure 1: Model outline 
 
 
As opposed to e.g. the telecommunications market, the two user bases 
(senders,  receivers)  are  not  necessarily  linked  together:  A  subscriber  for 
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choice when sending a letter (P.O. box holders can still send the mail with 
other carriers). However, downstream market share affect both cost structure 
and downstream income, which determines competitive behavior upstream. 
In  both  parts  of  the  market,  consumers  can  chose  between  two 
competing networks i and j, which are differentiated à la Hotelling. Given 
income  y,  constant  utility  v  from  subscription  to  the  network,  and  mail 
consumption  q,  a  consumer  (sender  /  receiver)  located  at  x  and  joining 
network i has utility 
 
  q u x x t v y U i m      . 
 
We assume that consumers are uniformly distributed over the interval 
[0,1]  and  the  two  networks  are  located  at  the  extremes.  tm  is  a  market-
specific parameter for the substitutability of the two competing networks and 
determines  the  degree  of  disutility  a  sender  perceives  from  the  network 
offering services that do not exactly meet the senders preference x. Thus, a 
consumer located at x = 0.5 is just about equally dissatisfied  by the two 
operators i and j located at xi = 0 and xj = 1 and finds herself indifferent. 
Following  Laffont,  Rey  and  Tirole  (1998)  we  define  quantity-dependent 
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We allow for redistribution of tariffs between senders and receivers by 
specifying the total quantity as a function both of the senders price pu and the 
receivers price pd.  If for example a bank client orders the monthly bank 
statement knowing that the postage will be charged on her bank account, 
receivers generate the mail, and the senders price still affects mail volumes 
although they do not actually pay for it. Similarly, if the client were charged 
a reception fee, this would again affect senders demand. Hence, sender‟s 




    i d i u p p q , ,  
 
with  constant  price  elasticity  of  demand  -η.  ζ  reflects  to  what  degree 
customers  can  redistribute  postage  by  means  of  private  negotiation  and 
hence, to what degree senders take into account the receiver price. With ζ 
close to 0, senders‟ demand is independent of the receiver price (resulting 
from the lack of negotiation between senders and receivers). ζ = 1 yields a 
situation  where  the  mail  originating  party  maximizes  over  the  aggregate Pricing in competitive two-sided mail markets  page 8 
 
 
variable price level, irrespective of the tariff structure. However, the market 
still  qualifies  the  two-sided  markets  property  as  long  as  the  fixed 
downstream  reception  fee  Pd  is  nonzero  (in  the  literature  referred  to  as 
“delivery flat rate”).  For Pd = 0, senders and receivers would be able to 
redistribute (pass through) charges behind the scene completely to the very 
same level irrespective of the operators‟ pricing strategies. 
The total cost for end-to-end postal service consists of a fixed part fm in 
both  the  upstream  (m=u)  and  downstream  markets  (m=d)  and  quantity-
dependent variable cost cm: 
 
  d u d u c c q f f C      . 
 
The operators‟ profit functions are then given by 
 
     
      










      
     
      

i d d i d j u i d i d i d j u
u j d i u i u i u i d i u
i d d u i d i u i d i u i d i u i d i u
P p p i
P f p p q c a p
f p p q c a p
P f f p p q c c p p
i d i d i u
, , , , , , ,
, , , , , ,








 ,  (1) 
 
where  αm,i  is  market  share  of  operator  i  in  market  m.  Hence,  a  postal 
operator‟s profit consists of three parts: The first part is due to letters she 
processes end-to-end. The second and the third ones relate to mails which 
originate  in  the  own  network  and  which  are  delivered  through  the  other 
operator‟s network, and vice versa. 
To solve the model, we derive the competitive outcome in the two sides 
of the postal market consecutively. Thereby, the model is solved backwards 
in  order  to  find  subgame  perfect  equilibria.  In  a  first  step,  we  analyze 
upstream  competition  in  non-discriminatory  linear  tariffs,  where  the  two 
networks compete for senders and yield optimal prices and market share in 
the upstream  market  as a function of  equilibrium downstream prices and 
market  shares.  In  a  second  step,  we  derive  optimal  two-part  pricing 
structures
5  of  the  downstream  market,  i.e.  competition  for  P.O.  box 
subscribers.  
We focus on parameter constellations, in which there exist unique and 
symmetric equilibria in both the upstream and downstream markets (cf. 
Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998, propositions 1 and 7). 
 
Upstream competition in non-discriminatory linear tariffs 
We start our analysis with upstream competition, where postal operators 
compete for quantity. At that stage, downstream prices pd
*, Pd
* and market 
shares αd
* are given from downstream competition and are symmetric. Under 
the assumption of uniform  and non-discriminatory  pricing (i.e. the postal Pricing in competitive two-sided mail markets  page 9 
 
 
operator is not able to discriminate mail by destination), the sender‟s net 
surplus in the upstream market is 
 
















d u u q d u u
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Operator i‟s market share is therefore 
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where 
u t u 2
1    is an index of substitutability resulting from the 
differentiated location of the senders and the operators.  













, d j d i d p p p   . The first-order condition of (1) with respect to pu is  
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Note  that  a  unit  increase  in  price  lowers  market  share  by  u    times 
quantity per customer:  q p u i u i u       , , /  and a unit loss of market share 
leads to the loss of the per-customer profit. In analogy to equation (8) in 
Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998), the first-order condition can be rewritten as 
 



























    is perceived direct marginal cost and  
 
        d d u d u d u d u d d u P f f p , p q c c p p
2
1
P , p , p           
 
is per-customer profit when the two networks charge identical prices. 
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Downstream competition in two-part tariffs 
In upstream competition, downstream prices pd
*, Pd
* and market shares 
αd
*  have  been  taken  as  given.  They  are  determined  in  downstream 
competition,  where  postal  operators  compete  for  market  share.  Again, 
differentiation  is  à  la  Hotelling.  Thereby,  operators  can  build  local 
monopolies, which strengthen their market power upstream. Receiver net 
surplus from chosen network i is 
 
  i d i d d d i d P p v v w , , 0 , ,    . 
 
Receiver  surplus  net  of  per-piece  price  pd,i  is  in  analogy  to  above 
denoted by vd . We introduce the term vd,0 to assure that wd,i > 0, i.e. that 
every  receiver  is  interested  in  joining  one  of  the  two  delivery  networks. 
Since a fraction ζ of this price is passed on to senders, we have 
 
  q p ) 1 ( q u ) p ( v i , d d i , d d     , 
 
such that operator i‟s market share is 
 
  j , d i , d d i , d w w
2
1




  . 
 
The model allows for any functional form of ud(q). For simplicity, we 
choose it such that  
 
q p v i d d   ) ( ' , .  
 
Then, the first-order condition to (1) with respect to pd,i yields  
 
    i , u i , u i , u i , u i , d i , d c p a 1 c p         
 
or, in a symmetric equilibrium, 
 






c p     . 
 
Hence, the networks‟ optimal downstream usage fee equals perceived 
marginal cost. Downstream market share is unaffected by it. However, the 
symmetric equilibrium subscriber fee determines the size of the downstream 
user base. It is given by 
 
d i , d
i











and therefore equal to the net marginal cost of adding a subscriber to the 
downstream network plus the Hotelling markup. 
Each unit loss of downstream market share implies a profit loss of 
 
    d d d u d d
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4.  SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Our main goal is to derive optimal pricing structures in liberalized postal 
markets,  where  potentially  all  involved  parties  (senders,  receivers,  and 
operators) can exert their bargaining power. Senders have the choice over 
competing operators; receivers can exclusively attribute a postal operator as 
their delivery partner of choice; and operators can establish a consumer base 
on one side of the market and sell it to the other one.  
 
A  calibration  of  the  model  enables  us  to  compute  numerically  the 
operators‟  optimal  pricing  strategies  as  a  function  of  the  reciprocal 
interconnection rate. We calibrate the model to correspond roughly to the 
size  and  the  characteristics  of  the  Swiss  letter  market.  The  number  of 
receivers is equal to 4m households and businesses. The current volume of 
addressed  letters  is  2.8bn  at  an  average  price  of  CHF  0.75  with  price 
elasticity η = 0.27.
6 Utility parameter β is calibrated to 650 to represent the 
Swiss letter market with approximately 700 letters per year and receiver. 
Total cost is CHF 2bn.
7 With roughly 50% delivery cost of which 50% are 
fixed and a fraction of fixed cost of 30% in collection and processing, we 
calibrate fu , cu , fd ,and cd accordingly. Moreover, we set σu = σd = 0.2.  
The  following  observations  and  results  apply  for  the  calibration  as 
above.  Other  calibrations might  yield  different  optimal  pricing  strategies. 
Note that Switzerland exhibits a very high postal scale.
8 Moreover, given the 
rough calibration and the stylized model, the results are only indicative. 
 
Figure  2  displays  the  optimal  pricing  strategies  depending  on  the 
exogenously set access price. We ran simulations with various values of ζ. 
Black lines are computed with  ζ = 0.25, dark grey lines with ζ = 0.5 and 
light grey lines with ζ = 0.75.  
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Observation  1  –  Optimal-pricing  structure:  The  results  partly 
replicate  the  pricing  structure  as  observed  in  the  completely  liberalized 
postal  market  of  New  Zealand  when  market  participants  agreed  on 
symmetric access prices to P.O. boxes. Given a similar regulatory regime, as 
set out in the model, we find an optimal pricing strategy in two-sided postal 
markets as follows: If the interconnection rate is about CHF 0.6, charge your 
key receivers a yearly delivery flat rate between CHF 250 and CHF 300. In 
turn, for every mail piece you deliver now exclusively, you pay (not charge!) 
your client (the receiver) about CHF 0.3 per mail piece (i.e. pd is negative). 
On the sender side, you charge about CHF 0.7 per piece. In such a setting, 
given upstream and downstream variable costs and before considering fixed 
costs,  net  profits  on  end-to-end  services  are  about  break  even,  whereas 
upstream services incur a loss (pu – a < cu) and downstream products are 
profitable (a + pd > cd).  
The results indicate that competition in two-sided postal markets forces 
operators to strongly cross-subsidize large receivers. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 show the effect of an increase of the interconnection 
rate on operators‟ profit per customer and mail volumes.  
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Observation  2  –  Effect  of  interconnection  charge:  Increasing 
interconnection rates make the downstream business more attractive (higher 
earnings  for  downstream  operators)  and  results  in  fiercer  downstream 
competition. This forces the operators to give their subscribers higher per 
piece  incentives  (more  negative  pd),  which  are  funded  by  higher  stamp 
prices. Partly, operators can recover higher incentives by higher subscriber 
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due  to  the  increased  relative  importance  of  downstream  market  shares 
(which  are  the  basis  for  downstream  profits).  Interestingly,  receivers‟ 
average price (pd + Pd/q) becomes negative for high interconnection rates, 
i.e.  they  become  increasingly  subsidized  and  make  a  profit  by  being 
connected to the postal network
9. Importantly, this redistribution comes at 
the cost of the networks, not at the cost of the senders, as the latter benefit 
from  the  receivers‟  better  bargaining  position  by  means  of  private 
rebalancing, which yields a lower price level pu + pd and thus higher mail 
volumes q.  
Thus, if we can exclude tacit collusion, high interconnection rates make 
the industry unattractive, as receivers enjoy increased bargaining power by 
means of regulation. 
 
Observation 3 – Effect of private redistribution: A higher value of ζ 
enables senders and receivers better to offset pricing structures by means of 
private redistribution. Recapitulate that at the extreme (ζ = 1) complete pass-
through of per piece prices takes place such that mail volumes q(p) depend 
just on the sum of the two variable prices p = pu + pd. Hence, the mail 
originating side includes total marginal postage into its calculations.  
Since the downstream price pd is negative, such redistribution leads to a 
participation  of  senders  in  downstream  incentives,  which  decreases  their 
perceived costs and thereby increases volumes (cf. Figure 4) and profits (cf. 
Figure 3). Put differently, if receivers not only are able to exert their market 
power towards the operators, but also towards the senders (lower value of ζ), 




5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Practical evidence from postal markets suggests that mail markets are 
two-sided. Hence, postal operators are platforms that enable communication 
and  transactions  between  two  parties  –  senders/mailers  on  one  side,  and 
receivers/recipients on the other. This two-sidedness raises two main issues, 
network effects and pricing.  
Network effects are present in most two-sided markets, and probably in 
postal markets too. Thus, we can expect the value of a postal network to 
increase the more customers are connected to it. We presume that the notion 
of ubiquitous access and delivery, which lies at the core of the Universal 
Service Obligation, is to be seen in this context. We do not include network 
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upstream and downstream market are present) as we are primarily interested 
in the pricing implications of the two-sidedness of the postal market.    
In terms of pricing, the two-sidedness makes things more complicated. 
Standard results of economic theory (related to one-sided markets) might fail 
in  two-sided  markets.  Wright  (2004)  spells  out  „eight  fallacies  that  arise 
from using one-sided logic in two-sided markets‟ and concludes that „the 
results may be very different from the normal marginal cost pricing familiar 
in one-sided markets‟. In our model, the interconnection of the two sides 
(upstream  and  downstream)  of  the  mail  market  yields  interesting  pricing 
considerations, which are a challenge for pricing departments as well as for 
regulators and competition authorities. In posts, recipients traditionally have 
been  served  by  monopoly  platforms  that  charged  the  senders  and  served 
receivers free of charge. This still holds true in virtually any industrialized 
country. For example, Swiss recipients get home delivery and P.O. boxes 
free of charge, the latter having the advantage of early morning delivery.  
How  do  things  change  in  liberalized  two-sided  mail  markets?  Will 
receivers remain subsidized? Our results indicate that in liberalized markets, 
key receivers will likely be subsidized even more. Depending on P.O. box 
regulations, the optimal strategy of postal operators towards receivers will be 
to offer them a costly P.O. box while paying them money for every mail 
piece delivered to this P.O. box. Thereby, large receivers will succeed in 
capitalizing on their address. Such pricing would have harmful effects on 
overall  mail  volumes  unless  senders  participate  accordingly  (which  is 
unlikely for the case of direct mail). We conclude that it is quite risky for 
postal operators to introduce receivers‟ pricing or incentives. This result may 
not hold for value added services. The results raise the more general question 
of who should pay for postal services from a welfare point of view. Jaag 
(2007) proposes a model and framework to address such issues.  
The  current  common  regulatory  view  states  that  P.O.  boxes  are 
monopolistic  bottlenecks  with  a  consequent  need  for  regulation.  This  is 
somewhat  astonishing  as  there  are  no  sunk  costs  related  to  P.O.  box 
provision
10. Our two-sided model suggests that we can expect competition 
for P.O. boxes   as observed in New Zealand   and that operators have  a 
common  interest  for  low  access  prices.   Hence,  in  terms  of  P.O.  box 
regulations, our results contradict the common view. We leave it for further 
research to assess whether this holds also true for models with asymmetric 
equilibria. However, as Panzar (2006) points out, the two -sidedness of the 
postal market makes access regulation to P.O. boxes a rather complex task 
and cost based pricing rules rather inappropriate. 
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1   Often, the official single-peace tariff is billed instead of the reduced business rates. 
2  Network externalities arise if the utility that a given user derives from joining a network depends upon 
the number of other users who are in the same network. Positive network externalities are present if a 
customers‟ utility of a good or service is an increasing function of the number of other users. 
3  Jaag (2007) discusses the welfare effects associated with the consumers‟ choice between costly 
doorstep delivery and free delivery to a P.O. box. 
4  In most countries, receivers have the choice between a free doorstep delivery and (sometimes-costly) 
P.O. box. It is important to note that as soon as a P.O. box is chosen, the P.O. box operator obtains the 
exclusive rights for final delivery into the P.O. box. In this view, the assumption could reflect the 
subset of mail destined to P.O. boxes, or a regulation where every household appoints the operator of 
her choice as its exclusive delivery carrier. 
5  I.e. the pricing for P.O. boxes consists of a fixed and a variable part where both parts can be positive 
(receiver pays), negative (receiver obtains) or zero (no money flow in either direction). 
6  For a discussion of demand parameters cf. Trinkner and Grossmann (2006). 
7  For a discussion of the cost structure of the Swiss mail market, cf. Dietl, Trinkner and Bleisch (2005) 
and Jaag (2006). 
8  See also PWC (2006). 
9   Recipients are therefore interested in joining a network which relaxes the previously introduced 
assumption of a value of vd,0 such that wd,i > 0.  
10 Note that considerable sunk costs are a precondition for the presence monopolistic bottlenecks. 